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1963] NOTES
importance to litigants. Henceforth, action to be taken upon
final and executory judgments of the courts of appeal must be
preceded by careful examination of the time the notices of judg-
ment were received by counsel of record, with the above rules
in mind.
H. F. Sockrider, Jr.
CIVIL PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY - ORAL EXAMINATION
OF OPPONENT'S EXPERT WITNESS
The state expropriated defendant's property for an amount
certified by two licensed realtors to be just compensation.' Be-
fore trial contesting the appraised fair market value of the
property, defendant sought by oral deposition to determine the
manner in which one realtor arrived at his valuation. The real-
tor testified he could not remember without referring to his
notes, which counsel for the state had instructed him not to do.
Subsequently, on the trial of a rule to show cause why he should
not answer all questions, the court ordered the realtor to consult
whatever material he planned to use upon trial of the case and
to answer questions in regard to facts upon which he based his
appraisal. The state contended this order violated Louisiana
§ 1; id. 1:55, as amended, La. Acts 1956, No. 549, provides that the following days
are legal holidays all over the state: Sundays; January 1; January 8; January
19; February 22; May 30; June 3; July 4; August 30; Labor Day (1st Monday
in September) ; November 1; November 11; Thanksgiving Day (4th Thursday in
November) ; Christmas Day; Inauguration Day in Baton Rouge. For cases in-
volving the question of legal holidays, see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Fried-
man, 137 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (February 12, Lincoln's Birthday,
held not a legal holiday) ; Hulin v. Hale, 137 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(same) ; Genovese v. Abernathy, 135 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (Christ-
mas is a legal holiday) ; Guarisco Constr. Co. v. Talley, 126 So. 2d 793 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) (same) ; McGee v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 125
So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960) (Sunday is a legal holiday).
Further, courts of appeal are without authority to grant additional time for
the application (Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal XI, § 1, in LA. R.S. ANN.
70, 75 (West, Supp. 1961) ; Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349
(1938) ; Kelley v. Ozone Tung Coop., 38 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948)),
even though the untimeliness is due solely to a miscarriage of the mails (McGee
v. Southern Farm Cas. Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1900)), a
party's change in attorneys (Clark v. Delta Tank Mfg. Co., 22 So. 2d 135 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1945)), or a secretary's misinterpretation of the attorney's instruc-
tions (Clostio's Heirs v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 37 So.2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948)).
1. LA. R.S. 48:441-460 (Supp. 1962). The procedure is basically the follow-
ing: amount of money estimated to be just and adequate is paid into registry of
court; ex parte order issued declaring property has been taken for highway pur-
poses; title vests in state when money deposited; defendant must contest within
ten days, or every claim waived except claims for compensation; defendant has
the burden of proof in establishing any market value other than the one alleged
by the state.
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Code of Civil Procedure Article 1452 by requiring the produc-
tion or inspection of a writing prepared by an expert. On cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the order.
Held, an order requiring an expert witness to refresh his
memory from written memorandum within his possession, in
order to testify to facts upon which he based his opinion, does
not require production or inspection of any writing prepared by
an expert. State, Through Dep't of Highways v. Spruell, 142
So. 2d 396 (La. 1962).
Discovery procedure enables all parties to obtain informa-
tion essential to the presentation of their cases, thus advancing
the cause of justice through ascertainment of the truth, and
often leads to settlements that minimize litigation. However,
opposition to the discovery of opinions of an opponent's expert
witness is encountered. Such opposition is often based on depri-
vation of property without due process of law, attorney-client
privilege, "work product" doctrine, or unfairness to the opposing
party or the expert.2 The lower federal courts have developed
two lines of authority, one allowing discovery of an expert's
opinion when good cause is shown, the other denying the right
to obtain the expert's opinion.3
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure adopted a modified
version of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.4 One important Louisiana discovery provision allows
deposition upon oral examination of any person by merely giving
proper notice to all parties to the action. 5 Any party or witness
who wishes to oppose the deposition must initiate court action,
2. See generally 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.24 (Supp. 1962) ; Frieden-
thal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STANFORD
L. REV. 455 (1962) ; Annot., Pretrial Deposition -Discovery of Opinions of
Opponent's Expert Witnesses, 86 A.L.R. 2d 138 (1962).
3. E.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F. 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948)
(opinion of an expert may be discovered) ; cf. Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941) (court in its discretion refused to allow
discovery of experts' opinion). See also Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 138, 142 (1962):
"The very general import of the federal cases on the matter is that although
pretrial deposition discovery of the expert opinion of an opposing party's expert
witness is not per se prohibited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
may, in a proper case, be authorized, such discovery ordinarily will not be per-
mitted except in instances of extreme need thereof by the examining party and
inability on his part to obtain expert opinion on the same matter from other
sources."
4. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 1421-1515 (1960), originally adopted
as LA. R.S. 13:3741-3794 (Supp. 1952) ; see Hubert, The New Louisiana Statute
on Depositions and Discovery, 13 LA. L. REV. 173 (1953).
5. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1451 (1960) (proper notice requires
statement of time and place for taking deposition and name and address of each
person to be examined).
[Vol. XXIII
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and bears the burden of proving good cause for the issuance of
a protective court order."
In Louisiana, an expert witness is treated as any other wit-
ness with one exception: the court cannot order production or
inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the expert,
unless denial of access to the writing would unfairly prejudice
or cause undue hardship to the party seeking it, 7 and in no event
can the order encompass any part of such writings which reflect
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of the
expert.8
In State, Through Dep't of Highways v. Spruell the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court announced that an order by the trial court
requiring an expert to prepare himself for oral examination by
consulting his written notes was not an order for production or
inspection of any writing of an expert,10 and consequently there
was no need to show undue hardship or injustice. The court
clearly indicated an expert can be orally examined the same as
any other person." Since other persons can be questioned in
discovery proceedings on any relevant matter, 12 including opin-
ion, it should follow that an expert can be questioned as to his
mental impressions, conclusions, and opinions.13  However,
6. Id. art. 1452.
7. Ibid.; State, Through Dep't of Highways v. Spruell, 243 La. 202, 142 So. 2d
396 (1962) ; see Hubert, The New Louisiana Statute on Depositions and Discov-
ery, 13 LA. L. REV. 173, 193-94 (1953).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 243 La. 202, 142 So. 2d 396 (1962).
10. As early as 1907 a Massachusetts court in requiring an expert witness to
refresh his memory from notes within his possession indicated this was similar
to requiring a witness to listen to a question and to reflect on it in order to give
a proper answer. Stevens v. Worcester, 196 Mass. 45, 56, 81 N.E. 907, 910
(1907).
11. State, Through Dep't of Highways v. Spruell, 142 So. 2d 396, 399 (La.
1960). Referring to oral examination of an expert under Article 1436 the court
emphasized that testimony of any person could be taken and stated "there is no
specific exclusion of experts as such from the provisions of this article." The
court then referred to writings in 13 LA. L. REV. 173, 193-94, by Leon D. Hubert,
Jr., one of the Reporters who drafted the projet of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as further support for the proposition that experts were not intended to be
excluded.
12. LA. CODE OF CIL PROCEDURE art. 1436 (1960) provides in part: "Unless
otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Article 1452 or 1454, the deponent
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action. . . . It is not ground for objection
that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
13. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 10-18 (1954) ; 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1917-
1929 (3d ed. 1940). "In all jurisdictions testimony to the value of a specific piece
of property is now received, as not obnoxious to the Opinion rule." Id. § 1943.
Of. as to criminal procedure LA. R.S. 15:464 (1950) : "On questions involving a
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writings of an expert on these matters are privileged. 14 Although
this distinction between writings and oral examination has been
attacked as unsound, 5 a practical distinction is easily discerni-
ble. It is one thing to answer specific questions thought of by
the examining party and quite another to produce a written
document containing a description of the problem, detailed
analysis, and listing of alternative solutions. An expert, just as
an attorney preparing his case, 16 must sift the facts he con-
siders relevant from the irrelevant. Prohibiting disclosure of
the expert's writings requires the opposing attorney to marshal
the facts himself; he cannot rely on the expert's work, paid for
by his adversary. Furthermore, if the expert's writings were
available to other parties, he might avoid writing many things
he would otherwise have recorded. Inefficiency, and perhaps
unfairness, would result.
In Spruell the court required the expert to consult written
materials he expected to use upon trial of the case. Perhaps the
court would have been unwilling to require the expert to do
additional research, and rightly so. 1 7 Nevertheless, an expert
knowledge obtained only by means of a special training or experience the opinions
of persons having such special knowledge are admissible as expert testimony."
14. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1452 (1960).
15. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Informa-
tion, 14 STANFORD L. REV. 455, 477 (1962) : "A comment following the Louisi-
ana provision, as originally enacted, stated that insofar as experts were concerned
only writings were prohibited, and that it was expressly intended that the deposi-
tions of the experts would freely be allowed. Such a distinction between reports
and other forms of discovery is absurd, particularly when the rule provides that
reports cannot be produced under any conditions whatsoever. If a party may dis-
cover an expert's opinion by deposition when the expert is available, there seems
little reason to deny automatically discovery of such information in reports if
the expert cannot be found."
16. Much of what was said in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
(1947), about an attorney can aptly be applied to an expert: "In performing his
various duties . . . it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of pri-
vacy free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the his-
torical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our
system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests.
This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, corre-
spondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible ways -aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in this case as the 'work product of the lawyer.' Were such materials open
to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing
would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not
be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop
in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect
on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients
and the cause of justice would be poorly served."
17. See United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75,
77 (1962) : "While an expert may under certain circumstances be required to
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should not be allowed to avoid answering all questions by claim-
ing lapse of memory. Although the court carefully noted that
the order of the lower court only required the expert to answer
questions in regard to facts, it did not indicate that oral ex-
amination must be limited to facts. Thus, as a minimum, the
expert must be prepared to answer questions as to facts; but if
at the time of examination he can draw an opinion from facts
within his knowledge, this, too, is evidence which generally
should be available to the examiner.' 8
Because abuse of discovery procedure is possible, the federal
trial courts have been granted broad discretionary power to
control this procedure. 19 For similar reasons broad discretion
like that existing under the federal rules, upon which Louisiana
discovery procedure is largely based, seems appropriate. How-
ever, since for purposes of discovery upon oral examination the
expert must be prepared to answer questions as to facts; but if
mitted that the opponent of the deposition is the party who must
show good cause to warrant the court's exercising its discretion
in limiting discovery of an opponent's expert witness.20
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testify at a trial, he cannot be compelled to make examinations or experiments,
or otherwise acquire knowledge upon which an opinion may be based. 8 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d Ed.) § 2203, p. 134; Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., D.C.
Mass., 1941, 36 F. Supp. 593."
18. See notes 2 and 13 supra.
19. BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 715 (1961),
referring to Federal Rule 30(b) and 30(d) : "These provisions give the court broad
power to control the use of the discovery process and to prevent its abuse and
the exercise of this power is in the sound discretion of the court." E.g., National
Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Portman v. Amer-
ican Home Products Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
In a recent eminent domain proceeding a federal trial court disallowed discov-
ery of an expert's opinion of the value of property, but required each party to
furnish the other with a list of comparable sales and of all other sales of property
considered relevant in evaluating the property in question. United States v.
19.897 Acres of Land, More or Less, 27 F.R.D. 420, 422 (E.D. N.Y. 1961):
"Nevertheless, it would tend to shorten the trial if both sides knew in advance
of the trial what sales of other properties each party may contend on the trial
can possibly be relevant to the issue of value of the damaged parcel. Such advance
notice would afford each party the opportunity to examine all such parcels and
inquire into the terms and conditions of each sale before the trial for the purpose
either of supporting or attacking the weight to be given to the same by the trier
of the fact, without committing either party to state now what particular factor
or factors will be relied upon by their experts to support their respective opinions."
20. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1452 (1960) (party seeking to limit
right to oral examination must establish good cause for protective court order to
issue).
